Published Research
Click on an item in the list below to expand into links and abstracts of some of my recent published work
If you want a full list of all my publications, see my CV on this page.
+How do financial lobbying networks operate across borders?
"The Internationalization of European Financial Networks: A quantitative text analysis of EU consultation responses", Review of International Political Economy, DOI: 10.1080/09692290.2020.1779781. Coauthored with Scott James and Stefano Pagliari.
Abstract: Regulatory initiatives are frequently shaped by the ability of the financial industry to build alliances across the wider business community. Yet comparative and international political economy scholarship remains divided over how to explain the resulting networks of financial lobbying. Using quantitative text analysis of 1300 responses to EU financial regulatory consultations between 2010 and 2018, we map patterns of lobbying coordination based on cosigning and text re-use in consultation responses for the first time. This unique dataset is used to analyze hitherto hidden patterns of domestic and cross-border coordination by financial organizations within and between European countries. We find that while distinctive national lobbying networks persist at the country level, the internationalization of financial actors is statistically associated with the formation of coordination ties with foreign financial actors. This suggests that European financial integration has facilitated the emergence of new cross-border alliances which complement – rather than substitute for – existing domestic financial interest coalitions. We argue that the text-as-data approach employed here makes an important new contribution to scholarship on business power and the political economy of Europe.
+How diverse are global elites, in terms of gender and race?
**"How white is the global elite? An analysis of race, gender and network structure", Global Networks 21(2): 365-392.
Abstract: Research on elites often utilizes network analysis to describe and analyse the interrelationships among elites and how their prominence varies by demographic characteristics. We examine the diversity of global elites through an analysis of the board members of large corporations, think tanks, international organizations, and transnational policy planning groups. Using new data, we provide the first descriptive picture of global elite networks in terms of race and gender. We also test the ‘core–periphery’ hypothesis, which predicts that as non-whites and women achieve elite positions they will be marginalized to the periphery of elite networks, while the core remains significantly more white and male. We find consistent evidence for the core–periphery hypothesis across a range of empirical tests, from simple k-coring to various core–periphery models. Most groups decline in their representation in the core, and this includes white women. White men are the only group that increases in representation in the core compared to the periphery.
+Do conservatives think about science the same way across the world?
**"Trust in scientific information mediates associations between conservatism and coronavirus responses in the U.S., but few other nations", Scientific Reports 2022) 12:3724. Co-authored with Quinnehtukqut McLamore, Stylianos Syropoulos, Bernhard Leidner, Gilad Hirschberger, Rizqy Amelia Zein, Anna Baumert, Michal Bilewicz, Arda Bilgen, Maarten J. van Bezouw, Armand Chatard, Peggy Chekroun, Juana Chinchilla, Hoon-Seok Choi, Hyun Euh, Angel Gomez, Peter Kardos, Ying Hooi Khoo, Mengyao Li, Jean-Baptiste Légal, Steve Loughnan, Silvia Mari, Roseann Tan-Mansukhani, Orla Muldoon, Masi Noor, Maria Paola Paladino, Nebojša Petrović, Hema Preya Selvanathan, Özden Melis Uluğ, Michael J. Wohl, Wai Lan Victoria Yeung and Brooke Burrows.
Abstract: U.S.-based research suggests conservatism is linked with less concern about contracting coronavirus and less preventative behaviors to avoid infection. Here, we investigate whether these tendencies are partly attributable to distrust in scientific information, and evaluate whether they generalize outside the U.S., using public data and recruited representative samples across three studies (Ntotal = 34,710). In Studies 1 and 2, we examine these relationships in the U.S., yielding converging evidence for a sequential indirect effect of conservatism on compliance through scientific (dis)trust and infection concern. In Study 3, we compare these relationships across 19 distinct countries. Although the relationships between trust in scientific information about the coronavirus, concern about coronavirus infection, and compliance are consistent cross-nationally, the relationships between conservatism and trust in scientific information are not. These relationships are strongest in North America. Consequently, the indirect effects observed in Studies 1–2 only replicate in North America (the U.S. and Canada) and in Indonesia. Study 3 also found parallel direct and indirect effects on support for lockdown restrictions. These associations suggest not only that relationships between conservatism and compliance are not universal, but localized to particular countries where conservatism is more strongly related to trust in scientific information about the coronavirus pandemic.
+How should we address the 'blind spots' within International Political Economy (IPE) scholarship?
**"Progress, pluralism and science: moving from alienated to engaged pluralism", Review of International Political Economy, 28(2): 406-420.
Abstract: The encompassing scale and scope of International Political Economy (IPE) is rare in the social sciences. Our subject matter affects the way our field organizes and produces knowledge: we study complex overlapping systems where the challenges of adequate description and causal explanation are especially difficult, and as such IPE scholarship borrows from a vast range of social theory and methods. While holding enormous productive potential, this space for pluralism, as currently practiced, risks culminating in the fragmentation of knowledge: what I call ‘alienated pluralism’. A different, ‘engaged pluralism’ as I propose would retain the diversity of IPE’s many approaches and traditions, but would promise greater knowledge synthesis. I argue that stronger adherence to a scientific ethos can assist in building this ‘engaged pluralism’.
+Are business' regulatory preferences independent or socially influenced?
"Network effects in the formation of the financial industry's regulatory preferences in the European Union", Business and Politics 22(1): 52-84. Co-authored with Adam William Chalmers
Abstract: This paper examines the determinants of financial industry actors’ regulatory preferences—examining why some financial industry actors prefer less stringent financial regulations while others prefer more stringent regulations. The determination of preferences, we argue, can be understood as mutually dependent. How an organization is connected to other organisations through network ties may help to explain its regulatory preferences. Our empirical point of focus is financial industry lobbying in the context of the European Union (EU). Using data from nearly nine hundred lobbying letters related to legislation on banking, insurance, and securities regulation, we map out a “socialization network” that models connections between financial industry firms, their associations, as well as a broad range of other organisations and actors that are auxiliary to this community of organizations. Using these data we find evidence that organizations’ preferences are informed by their location within this socialization network. Controlling for a range of other plausible factors, we find that 1) those connected via common associational ties, 2) those closer to one another in the network and 3) those more “embedded” in this network are all less likely to diverge in terms of their preferences from one another.
+Does the 'financialization' of everyday life affect people's attitudes toward financial regulation?
“The Financialization of Policy Preferences: Financial Asset Ownership, Regulation and Crisis Management”,Socio-Economic Review, 18(3): 665-680. Coauthored with Stefano Pagliari and Lauren Philips.
Abstract: Political economists have often drawn a hard line between the interests of owners of capital and the interests of labor. Yet over the past 30 years in Anglo-Saxon countries in particular, workers have become increasingly invested in capital markets activity through the privatization of pension systems and other incentives for market-based savings. In this article, we investigate whether this ‘financialization of everyday life’ has generated a convergence of policy preferences whereby individuals support policies traditionally associated with the financial sector. Using three separate datasets on the US population, we find evidence that financial asset ownership is associated with lower support for more stringent financial regulatory policy, and higher support for financial sector bailouts. Such effects on individual preferences are modest on average, but persist even when controlling for indicators of social class and a range of other conditions, circumstances and time periods.
+What do averge citizens think about financial reform?
“Status Quo Conservatism, Placation, or Partisan Division? Analyzing Citizen Attitudes Toward Financial Reform in the United States”, New Political Economy 24(3): 313-333. Co-authored with Alper Yagci.
Abstract: Within the literature on financial governance a key question is why the 2008 financial crisis did not elicit a stronger regulatory reaction than it did – the ‘post-crisis stasis’ puzzle. We explore a neglected dimension of this puzzle: public attitudes toward financial regulation. Using a variety of survey data of the US public we find that there was persistent support for stronger financial regulation following the crisis, even support for radical reform in some instances, and support continued even after regulatory reform had been enacted. Despite such general sentiment, however, at nearly every stage public attitudes were highly conditional on partisan affiliation – a hugely consequential detail that meant that demand for reform was not channelled into more stringent policy but rather into a highly partisan, status quo protecting political machinery. Our analysis challenges notions of US public attitudes as either conservative in orientation or placated through modest reform, but also highlights the importance of domestic political constraints in shaping financial reform options despite majoritarian support for more robust reform.
+Does science fiction affect attitudes toward foreign policy?
“Does Science Fiction Affect Political Fact? Yes and No: A Survey Experiment on ‘Killer Robot Sentiment'", International Studies Quarterly, 62(3): 562-576. Co-authored with Charli Carpenter.
Abstract: Some scholars suggest popular culture shapes public attitudes about foreign policy in ways that can affect real-world political outcomes, but relatively few studies test this proposition. We examine whether—and more importantly how—popular culture affects public opinion on foreign policy through a survey experiment on American attitudes toward fully autonomous weapons. We queried respondents about their consumption of popular culture—including a number of iconic science-fiction films featuring armed artificial intelligence (AI)—before or after questions about autonomous weapons. We find that science fiction “priming” exerts no independent effect on political attitudes, nor does referring to autonomous weapons as “killer robots.” However, consumption of frightening armed AI films is associated with greater opposition to autonomous weapons. This “sci-fi literacy” effect increases for the highest consumers of science fiction if they are “primed” about popular culture before reporting their attitudes—what we call the “sci-fi geek effect.” Our project advances current understanding of how popular culture affects public opinion on foreign policy and suggests avenues for further inquiry. 6: https://academic.oup.com/isq/article/62/3/562/5077057
+Has a global convergence of financial systems occurred?
“An Empirical Investigation of the Financialization Convergence Hypothesis”, Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 24, Issue 6 (2017), pp. 1004-1029. Co-authored with Sylvia Maxfield and W. Kindred Winecoff.
Abstract: Claims of global homogenization towards a singular model of finance capitalism constitute a “financialization convergence hypothesis” that has not been subject to systematic empirical scrutiny. Using extensive firm-level data we center on the key indicator of firm leverage, and reveal that substantial cross-national and cross-firm variation still persists. We first compare distributions across OECD countries and find no significant evidence of convergence over time. We then assess whether firms classified as prudent by a simple leverage threshold comprise a declining share of total financial assets over time. We find they do not, and that trajectories remain largely distinct. We do find empirical evidence of financialization convergence in two specific areas. First, there was convergence within the US and the UK in the years immediately proceeding the crisis – but not in other countries representative of stereotypical non-Anglo-American types financial systems, such as Germany and France. Second, we find convergence within the category of large, transnationally-active financial firms. Overall our results suggest that while the behavior of the world's largest globally active financial institutions is converging irrespective of home domicile, their activities are not necessarily leading to the general global homogenization of financial forms and activities implied by the financialization convergence hypothesis.
+When Big Data and the study of corporate networks meet, how to we improve our measures?
"Big Corporate Network Data: Problems, Diagnostics and Fixes," 2018. Global Networks 18(1): 3-32. Co-authored with Eelke M. Heemskerk, Frank W. Takes, Bruce Cronin, Javier Garcia-Bernardo, Vladimir Popov, W. Kindred Winecoff, Lasse Folke Henriksen and Audrey Laurin-Lamonthe.
Abstract: Network data on connections between corporate actors and entities – for instance through co‐ownership ties or elite social networks – are increasingly available to researchers interested in probing the many important questions related to the study of modern capitalism. Given the analytical challenges associated with the nature of the subject matter, variable data quality and other problems associated with currently available data on this scale, we discuss the promise and perils of using big corporate network data (BCND). We propose a standard procedure for helping researchers deal with BCND problems. While acknowledging that different research questions require different approaches to data quality, we offer a schematic platform that researchers can follow to make informed and intelligent decisions about BCND issues and address these through a specific work‐flow procedure. For each step in this procedure, we provide a set of best practices for how to identify, resolve and minimize the BCND problems that arise.
+What effects do elite social ties have on business lobbying?
"Beyond the Revolving Door: Advocacy Behavior and Social Distance to Financial Regulators”, Business and Politics, Vol. 19, Issue 2 (2017), pp. 327-364. Co-authored with Tim Marple and James Heilman.
Abstract: The financial system is governed not just by formal rules but also by social relationships that pervade the elite strata of society. Understanding such dynamics entails understanding complex relational ties between actors, a task that can be facilitated through the use of network analysis. We argue that a latent feature of interest to scholars of the political economy of finance is one of social distance, which is a measurable concept. Using new data from the financial sector, we measure the social distance between a range of financial firms and one key regulator, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), over time to assess whether or not social distance is related to organizations’ advocacy behavior. We find a positive relationship between how close a given organization is to the SEC and how often it engages in advocacy. The result persists when we control for numerous factors related to organizational characteristics, firm size, and when we measure advocacy frequency in different ways.
+How is International Political Economy (IPE) organized as a field of study?
"The Networks and Niches of International Political Economy", Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 24, Issue 2 (2017), pp. 288-331. Co-authored with Leonard Seabrooke.
Abstract: We analyze the organizational logics of how social clustering operates within International Political Economy (IPE). Using a variety of new data on IPE publishing, teaching, and conference attendance, we use network analysis and community detection to understand social clustering within the field. We find that when it comes to publishing and intellectual engagement, IPE is highly pluralistic and driven by a logic of ‘niche proliferation’. Teaching IPE, however, is characterized by a ‘reduction to polarity’ that emphasizes a dualism in ontological and epistemological frames. In the face of competitive exclusion pressures, intellectual communities regenerate themselves by constructing niches while simultaneously nodding to a common tradition.
+Is the business community unified over regulatory policy?
"Capital United? Business Unity in Regulatory Politics and the Special Place of Finance", Regulation and Governance, Vol. 11, Issue 1 (2017), pp. 3-23. Co-authored with Stefano Pagliari.
Abstract: While organized business is a key actor in regulatory politics, its influence is often conditional on the level of unity or conflict occurring within the business community at any given time. Most contemporary regulatory policy interventions put pressure on the normal mechanisms of business unity, as they are highly targeted and sector‐specific. This raises the question of how business unity operates across a highly variegated economic terrain in which costs are asymmetric and free‐riding incentives are high. In this paper, we empirically assess patterns of business unity within regulatory policymaking across different regulated sectors. Our analysis utilizes data from hundreds of regulatory policy proposals and business community reactions to them in the telecommunications, energy, agriculture, pharmaceutical, and financial sectors over a variety of institutional contexts. We find considerable empirical support for the “finance capital unity” hypothesis – the notion that the financial sector enjoys more business unity than other regulated sectors of the economy. When the financial sector is faced with new regulations, business groups from other sectors frequently come to its aid.
+Who opposes the financial industry, and when?
"The Interest Ecology of Financial Regulation: An Empirical Analysis", Socio-Economic Review, Vol. 14, No. 2 (2016), pp. 309-337. Co-authored with Stefano Pagliari.
Abstract: Existing literature has offered a variety of claims regarding why financial regulatory politics features a relative dominance of the regulated financial industry. In this article, we explore the broader interest group environment in which financial industry advocacy operates. Using new data on interest group participation in financial regulatory consultations, we provide the first comprehensive analysis of the ecology of interest groups that populate financial regulatory policymaking. Through a new measure of ‘mobilized dissent’, we find evidence that the level of interest group pluralism in financial regulatory policymaking is constrained by the limited mobilization of voices outside of the business community. We analyse how mobilized dissent towards the regulated financial industry changes in response to different institutional environments. While technical complexity, institutional context and the global financial crisis are found to impact the level of mobilized dissent, the impact of these environmental conditions varies across different groups. This analysis reveals not only that organized opposition to the financial industry is relatively weak, but also that it is relatively disjointed.
+How should we measure the 'structural power' of business?
“Not by Structure Alone: Power, Prominence and Agency in American Finance”, Business and Politics, Vol. 17, Issue 3 (2015), pp. 443-472.
Abstract: I examine the challenges of conceptualization and measurement of structural power when the differential power of industries or individual firms are in question. While ascertaining structural power's operation at this level can be very challenging, I point to some issues of conceptualization and measurement that can enhance our analytic leverage at the initial stages of the research process. Specifically I propose a more refined language of “structural prominence” to differentiate between the expected causes of structural power from its hypothesized effects. Using a variety of data I show that researchers have some simple tools at their disposal but must pay careful attention to basic logical inferential limitations when examining structural power arguments. Through an examination of firms’ reactions to policy proposals in US securities regulation I find positive evidence for structural power operating in initial policy proposals. When I examine levels of preference attainment in the policymaking process itself, structural power appears to be playing a weaker and more conditional role. I also find that the preference attainment of firms is greatest when structural and instrumental forces operate in conjunction, a finding supportive of recent research in this area.
+How does national identity affect trust in science?
**“The distinct associations of ingroup attachment and glorification with responses to the coronavirus pandemic: Evidence from a multilevel investigation in 21 countries", British Journal of Social Psychology, forthcoming. Co-authored with Quinnehtukqut McLamore, Stylianos Syropoulos, Bernhard Leidner, Gilad Hirschberger, Maarten J. van Bezouw, Daniel Rovenpor, Maria Paola Paladino, Anna Baumert, Michal Bilewicz, Arda Bilgen, Armand Chatard, Peggy Chekroun, Juana Chinchilla, Hoon-Seok Choi, Hyun Euh, Angel Gomez, Peter Kardos, Ying Hooi Khoo, Mengyao Li, Jean-Baptiste Légal, Steve Loughnan, Silvia Mari, Roseann Tan-Mansukhani, Orla Muldoon, Masi Noor, Nebojša Petrović, Hema Preya Selvanathan, Özden Melis Uluğ, Michael J. Wohl, Wai Lan Victoria Yeung, and Rizqy Amelia Zein.
**
Abstract: While public health crises such as the coronavirus pandemic transcend national borders, practical efforts to combat them are often instantiated at the national level. Thus, national group identities may play key roles in shaping compliance with and support for preventative measures (e.g., hygiene and lockdowns). Using data from 25,159 participants across representative samples from 21 nations, we investigated how different modalities of ingroup identification (attachment and glorification) are linked with reactions to the coronavirus pandemic (compliance and support for lockdown restrictions). We also examined the extent to which the associations of attachment and glorification with responses to the coronavirus pandemic are mediated through trust in information about the coronavirus pandemic from scientific and government sources. Multilevel models suggested that attachment, but not glorification, was associated with increased trust in science and compliance with federal COVID-19 guidelines. However, while both attachment and glorification were associated with trust in government and support for lockdown restrictions, glorification was more strongly associated with trust in government information than attachment. These results suggest that both attachment and glorification can be useful for promoting public health, although glorification's role, while potentially stronger, is restricted to pathways through trust in government information.
+What is unique about financial industry advocacy?
“Leveraged Interests: Financial Industry Power and the Role of Private Sector Coalitions", Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 21, Issue 3 (2014), pp. 575-610.Co-authored with Stefano Pagliari.
Abstract: The power of financial industry groups is a subject of widespread academic and public debate. Existing international political economy (IPE) research has highlighted how different resources, institutions and structural features allow financial industry groups to influence financial regulatory policymaking. In so doing, however, this literature routinely tends to neglect the wider array of interest groups beyond the particular financial industry groups being regulated. Actor plurality is usually assumed to be low or inconsequential. Such an assumption obscures the important role that actor plurality may play in the policymaking process. We present new quantitative and qualitative evidence demonstrating how global financial regulatory politics is more plural than most existing depictions would suggest. Actor plurality can have significant effects in ‘leveraging’ the influence of financial industry groups, which are often able to tie in their interests with those of other private sector groups affected indirectly by the regulation in question. We illustrate this underappreciated facet of financial industry power through a variety of case-based evidence from the formation of banking and derivatives rules in various jurisdictions, both before and after the global financial crisis of 2008–10.